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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is appropriate in this case pursuant to UCA §78-2a-3(2)(j) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I Is a facially invalid "mechanic's lien" subject to the wrongful lien statute9 
This is matter of statutory interpretation A matter of statutory interpretation is a 
question of law and is reviewed on appeal for correctness State v Schofield, 63 P 
3d 667 (Utah 2002) 
II. Did the Tnal Court property award Plaintiffs their attorney's fees9 
The standard on review of an appeal of the amount of a Trial Court's award of 
attorney's fees is patent error or clear abuse of discretion Packv Caser 30 P 3d 
436 (Utah App 2001) 
ID. Did the Tnal Court property deny Defendant's request to file a counterclaim9 
The granting of leave to amend is a matter which lies within the broad discretion of 
the Court, and its rulings are not to be disturbed m the absence of a showing of an 
abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the complaining party Girard v 
Appleby, 660 P 2d 245 (Utah 1983) 
IV. Was the Plaintiff precluded from receiving damages under the mechanic's hen 
statute by the doctrine of election of remedies? 
This is purely an issue of law When reviewing an issue of law the Appellant Court 
accords the Trial Court's legal conclusions no deference and reviews them for 
correctness Nova Casualty Company v Able Construction, Inc
 % 983 P 2d 575 
(Utah 1999) 
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V. Should the Defendant's appeal be dismissed based on his failure to martial 
evidence9 
This is a matter of original jurisdiction for the Court not Appellant review. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any determinative constitutional provision, statutes or rules are reproduced herein in 
Addendunf'A". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced with the filing of a Complaint on May 8, 2002. R l l . 
Contemporaneously therewith, the Plaintiff filed a Petition to Nullify Lien pursuant to UCA §38-9-7. 
R.20. The Defendant was served with a summons and copy of the Complaint and Petition to Nullify 
Lien on May 13, 2002. R. 23. The Defendant filed an Answer on May 31, 2002. R. 28. 
Thereafter, pursuant to Notice, a hearing was held pursuant to the wrongful lien statute, on June 
14, 2002. At the hearing the court determined the lien to be a wrongful lien and ordered that the lien 
was void. R. 31. Pursuant to the Court's Order, Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of Costs and Fees. R. 35. 
Defendant objected to that Affidavit (R. 38)and after a responsive memorandum (R. 47)the Court 
entered a ruling reiterating its award of fees, although it did reduce the amount of fees from $1,200.00 
to $750.00 with no explanation as to the reason for the reduction. R. 54. On September 19, 2002, 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 80. Oral argument on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment was held November 27, 2002. Pursuant to minute entry Plaintiffs motion was initially 
denied. R. 112. Pursuant to Rule 60 of the URCP the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from the 
Court's order denying their Motion for Summary Judgment. By memorandum and decision the Court 
had found that there had been no order yet entered on the denial for summary judgment and clarified its 
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ruling. R. 124 Subsequently the Defendant filed a Petition requesting the Court grant him permission 
to file a ctcountersuit". R. 160. 
Pursuant to the Courts Minute Entry a revised Order and Final Judgment was submitted to the Court 
for its signature. That Order and Final Judgment was entered by the Court on March 19. 2003. R. 184. On 
April 2. 2003. the Defendant file a Motion to Amend and Appeal Final Order and Judgment. R. 246. The 
Court subsequently entered a ruling denying the Motion of the Defendant to add his counterclaim. R. 251. 
By memorandum decision entered May 8, 2003. the Court denied the Defendant's Motion to Amend 
and Appeal Final Order and Judgment. R. 282. On May 28, 2003. Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal to 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs, Edson and Sharon Packer are Trustees of the respective Trusts which are the Plaintiffs in the 
above-entitled action. R. 183. 
2. The Defendant is an individual, who at all times relevant to these proceedings was the son-in-law of the 
individual Plaintiffs. R. 183 
3. At the time relevant to the proceedings the Defendant and the Plaintiffs daughter were involved in a 
divorce proceeding. 
4. On the 12th day of April, 2002, the Defendant filed a document entitled '"mechanic's lien'7 with the 
Wasatch County Recorder, against property owned by the Plaintiffs in the amount of $70,300.00. R. 
4 
5. The document purporting to be a mechanic's lien was invalid on its face as it failed to set forth the 
statutorily required elements and was untimely filed. R. 4, T .6 & T. 7. 
6. The purported mechanic's lien was also invalid due to the Defendant's failure to comply with the 
notice requirements of the mechanic's lien statute, including notice to the Plaintiffs of the steps they 
could take to have the lien removed. T. 7. 
7. Plaintiffs made demand on the Defendant pursuant to UCA §38-9-4 to release the lien. R. 1. 
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8. A period in excess of 20 days passed from the mailing of the letter and the Defendant failed to 
remove the lien. R. 183 
9. The Defendant alleges the lien was for the value of a mural painted on a wall in the home 
owned by the Plaintiffs. R. 183. 
10. The Defendant has failed to produce a single receipt or other documentary item supporting 
his claim for the lien amount of $70,300.00. R. 183. 
11. The Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendant performed no work on the mural, but rather 
that the work was done by their daughter. The Defendant has alleged that he performed a 
nominal amount of labor on the mural. R. 184. 
12. The Defendant has failed to establish what work, if any, he performed on the mural or the 
value of that service by any legitimate means, he has failed to identify when the work was 
allegedly performed, or how he derived a value for his services. R. 182. 
13. The Defendant alleges that he is entitled to a lien on the basis that the work was performed 
by his wife and that he supported his wife in her actions through such items as providing her 
transportation to her parent's home and his babysitting of their children while she worked on 
the mural. R. 182. 
14. Under oath the Defendant stated that the purpose of the lien was not to recover the money 
from his in-laws but instead to "protect" the Defendant from a claim that his in-laws might 
have been making on his residence as part of the forth coming divorce between the Defendant 
and his wife. R. 182. 
15. The Plaintiffs in their complaint sought recovery under the mechanic's lien statute, the 
wrongful lien statute, and under a general claim for punitive damages. R. 182. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Ed and Sharon Packer are Trustee of the respective Plaintiffs' Trusts set forth in the caption 
of the case 
Through their Revocable Testamentary Trusts they owned their home in Heber City, Utah 
The Packers have a daughter named Julie, who at the time pertinent to this Complaint were taking 
place was the wife of the Defendant, Earl Cline. 
Julie and Earl were having serious marriage difficulties Indeed those difficulties ended up 
resulting in the divorce of Julie and Earl. 
In the midst of these difficulties, issues arose as to moneys that the Packers claimed they had 
lent to Earl and Julie, which resulted in a claim upon marital assets of the Clines. 
When Earl was told, by Julie, that her parents were going to claim an interest in their marital 
residence for money that the Packers had provided to the Clines, Earl decided to be proactive and 
went to the Wasatch Recorders Office and file a "mechanic's lien" against the Packer's home and 
the homes of a number of their neighbors. 
When advised that the neighbors were going to sue him, Earl released that "mechanic's lien" 
and refiled a second "mechanic's lien" alleging that he had provided materials or services worth 
$70,300 00 on the Packer's home At that stage the Packers had no idea what Earls purported claim 
was for as they were well aware that he had not performed labor or provided materials at their home, 
for which there was ever any agreement for compensation. 
Notice was sent to Earl pursuant to statute, requesting that he remove the lien that had been 
filed against the Packer's home. Earl refused to do so. Subsequently a Complaint and a Petition to 
Nullify Lien were filed and served on Earl. 
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After the letter demanding release of the lien was sent, Earl contacted Plaintiffs counsel and 
informed him the claim was for a mural painted by the Packers' daughter, located on a wall in the 
Packers7 home A hearing was scheduled to nullify the lien pursuant to the wrongful lien statute. 
The hearing on June 14, 2002, was an evidentiary hearing It was not as Mr Cline seems to indicate 
a summary judgment hearing At the hearing the Court's initial concern was whether or not Mr. 
Cline had a valid mechanic's lien. The wrongful lien statute clearly states that it excludes mechanic's 
liens from its strictures. At the hearing the Plaintiffs pointed out there was no valid mechanic's lien 
as the claim was filed untimely, the Defendant did not perform any work on the property, there was 
no contract between the Packers and any party for the work that was performed and the purported 
mechanic's lien was invalid on its face for failing to contain the statutory elements necessary to 
comprise a valid mechanic's lien. P 326. At the hearing the Court focused on two areas 1) that the 
"mechanic's lien" was facially insufficient in that it did not contain the statutorily required elements 
and 2) that the "mechanic's lien" was invalid based on a failure to comply with the statutory 
requirements of notice to home owners as to have remove such liens on their property. T. 6-8. The 
Court accordingly nullified the lien and withheld ruling on the other issues in the Complaint, in 
accordance with the purpose of the hearing as set forth by statute. T. 8. Subsequently the matter 
came before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of its causes of action. 
Those causes of action were for damages under the wrongful lien statute, for damages under the 
mechanic's lien statute, and for punitive damages. The Court received evidence which showed that 
Mr. Cline had no basis for his claim of $70,300.00, and flirther found that based on the testimony 
presented and uncontroverted, that Mr. Cline had filed the lien in bad faith in an attempt to harass 
the Packers. In his appeal, just as at the summary judgment proceedings, Mr. Cline claims that he 
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had performed some labor or provided some materials for the mural in the Packers home However, 
Mr Cline failed to substantiate any such work or such materials or the value of such materials in his 
answers to the discovery requests of the Plaintiffs nor did he at any proceeding in this matter, identify 
an actual amount for which he purportedly was entitled compensation for labor he performed or 
material he provided. It is not enough for Mr. Cline simply to claim that he provided materials or 
services, it is his burden of proof to establish what those materials or services were and the value of 
the same. He failed to meet that burden and accordingly summary judgment was appropriate. 
There is one point however on which Plaintiffs and Mr. Cline agree, the Court erred in ruling 
that the mechanic's lien statute did not apply. 
It was the trial courts finding that Plaintiffs' claim for damages under the mechanic's lien and 
claim for damages under the wrongful lien statute required an election of remedies and afforded 
recovery under only one of the two statutory schemes. However, it is possible to have a document 
which is a wrongful lien that does not encompass claims under the mechanic's lien statute likewise 
it is possible to have a document that is a mechanic's lien properly filed for services rendered 
pursuant to contract but which is done for an improper purpose which would qualify only under the 
mechanic's lien statute and not the wrongful lien statute. Finally there is a third category of filings 
which purport to be mechanic's liens which in reality are not valid mechanic's liens and which meet 
the requirements of the wrongful lien statute. That is the type of filing that took place in this case. 
Plaintiffs would therefore request that the portion of the summary judgment granted in favor of Mr. 
Cline finding that the mechanic's lien case was subsumed by the wrongful lien statute be overturned 
and that Plaintiffs be entitled to pursue their damages under the mechanics lien statute as well as those 
damages already awarded pursuant to the wrongful lien statute. 
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The next issue raised by Mr. Cline, deals with the award of attorney's fees. At no stage or 
point does Mr. Cline argue that these were not necessarily incurred, that they were unreasonable in 
amount either in time or at the rate of compensation. Instead he argues that fees are not awardable 
under the mechanic's lien statute. The court should note first that the fees were not awarded under 
the mechanic's statute but under the wrongful lien statute. Accordingly, Mr. Cline's argument with 
respect to the provisions of the mechanic's lien statute are inapplicable. Furthermore, the mechanic's 
lien statute provision Mr. Cline's cites deals only with instances where there are issues involving the 
lien recovery fund. That is not the case here. To accept Mr. Cline's interpretation of the statute would 
be to render other portions of the statute most violating the rules of statutory construction. 
The final issue before the court is whether the court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Cline's 
motion to file a counterclaim. Mr. Cline's attempt to add the counterclaim came after the issues in this 
case had been disposed of on summaryjudgment and clearly was untimely. The Court, by it's ruling 
made it clear that all claims not otherwise barred by the compulsory counterclaim rules were available 
for Mr. Cline's filing in a separate proceeding. He has, to this point, decided not to pursue those claims 
in that fashion. 
The Court's finding that the lien was a wrongful lien was legally correct. The Court's award 
of damages in the amount of $3,000.00 was legally and factually correct based on the bad faith filing 
of Mr. Cline. The award of attorney's fees was correct pursuant to the statute and the failure of Mr. 
Cline to object in any relevant fashion to those fees. The Court's only error came in not awarding 
summaryjudgment to the Plaintiffs on their claim for damages under the mechanic's lien statute. To 
that degree, Plaintiff would agree that the matter should have be remanded to the Trial Court for 
addressing that sole issue. In the alternative this Court could appropriately enter judgment for Plaintiff 
in the requested amount of $140,600.00. Finally, as stated above the court's decision to deny Mr. 
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Cline's request for an amendment to his answer and permission to add a counterclaim at that late stage 
in the proceedings was proper based on the untimehness of the motion 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. CLINE'S LIEN WAS A "WRONGFUL LIEN". 
A. By Definition Defendant's Lien was a Wrongful Lien 
The definition of Wrongful Lien is set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 38-9-1 (6) as follows 
(6) "Wrongful Lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is 
recorded or filed is not 
a. expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
b. authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state, or 
c. signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the 
real property 
The scope of the Wrongflil Lien Statute is set forth in UCA § 38-9-2 The Defendant has 
focused on subpart 3 of this section which provides: 
'This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under section 38-1-3 who files a 
lien pursuant to Title 38, chapter 1, Mechanics Liens " 
Under the express language of this section, two tests must be met in order for a party to 
escape the reach of a Wrongful Lien Statute First, the person must be one who is entitled to file a 
mechanic's lien. Secondly, the lien must be filed in accordance with restriction of a mechanic's 
lien statute. 
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B. Defendant Was Not a Person Entitled to File a Mechanic's Lien. 
Defendant has stated at various times that he performed some limited amount of 
work on the mural in the home of the Plaintiffs He has alleged that at various times he 
had bought paint that his wife used when she did painting on the mural in the home Even 
at this stage of the proceedings however the Defendant has failed to quantify what 
purported materials or what services he actually alleges to have performed That proof is 
his burden The Plaintiffs requested, through Discovery, a detailed listing of the services 
allegedly performed by the Defendant and a break down and evidence of any materials he 
purports to have provided for the project In his Answer to the Interrogatories, the 
Defendant failed to provide any such detail l R 93 It has been long recognized that a 
naked assertion of a claim unsupported by any facts fails to raise a material issue of fact 
precluding a grant of summary judgment See e g Massey v Utah Power and Light, 609 P 
2d 937 (Utah 1980) A party cannot subsequently provide testimony contrary to previous 
sworn testimony such as in depositions or responses to interrogatories to try to create an 
issue of fact precluding the grant of summary judgment, unless there is an adequate 
explanation for such contradictory answers Webster v Sill 675 P2d 1170 (1983), Gaw v 
State, 798 P2d 1130 (Utah App 1990) Defendant has failed to provide any such 
reasonable explanation 
The issue was also addiessed at the healing foi Summarv Judgment, but Defendant/Appellant failed to 
request a transcript of that hearing 
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C. Defendant's Lien Was Not Filed In Accordance With the Mechanic's Lien 
Statute. 
The Defendant has failed to establish that he is a person entitled to file a lien He cannot 
claim to be a subcontractor because by definition a subcontractor works for a contractor. There is 
absolutely no evidence at any point that Julie Chne was acting as a "contractor". 
Even were the Defendant's assertions that he is a person entitled to file a lien under the 
Mechanic's Lien Statute accurate, he still fails the second part of the test set forth in UCA § 38-9-
2 (3). This second portion of the test requires that the lien be filed in accordance with the 
Mechanic's Lien Statute. It is undisputed that the Court found and Defendant has not objected to 
the Court's finding that the purported mechanic's lien was statutorily deficient in that it was 1) not 
filed timely, 2) facially insufficient for failing to state the time of the first and last labor allegedly 
performed or the first and last equipment or materials furnished and 3) that the Defendant failed to 
provide to the Plaintiffs the statement required by UCA § 38-1-7 (2) (a). By the plain language of 
the statute therefore, the lien was not filed pursuant to the Mechanic's Lien Statute and the 
Defendant was subject to the provisions of the Wrongful Lien Statute. 
IL THE COURT PROPERTY AWARDED PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEY FEES 
The traditional American rule, the rule in Utah, is that attorney's fees are not recoverable by 
a prevailing party unless authorized by statute or contract. Faust v. KAI Technologies, Inc. 15 P3d 
1266, 1269 (Utah 2000). Under UCA § 38-9-4 (3) the person who filed or causes to be recorded or 
filed a wrongful lien is responsible for damages in the amount of at least $3,000.00 and for 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs. UCA § 38-9-4 (3). PlaintifFs counsel submitted to Defendant 
and the Court detailed records setting forth the time and expenditures necessary to prosecute this 
case to its conclusion. The judgment submitted by PlaintifFs counsel and finally signed by the 
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Court took note of the Court's interlocutory initial ruling of an award of $750 00 in attorney's fees 
at the point of the initial hearing on the wrongful lien 
Defendant's arguments against the award of attorney's fees are posited under two 
arguments The second argument made was that the Court had previously reduced the $1,200 00 
in fees requested to $750 00 as the fees were ''excessive" First it should be pointed out that there 
was no ruling that the fees were excessive, the Court simply set a flat dollar figure for the fees 
Second it should be pointed out that the additional fees incurred in this matter were being incurred 
as a result of the actions of the Defendant and he should not be entitled to receive some sort of a 
benefit from his own dilatory actions Finally, as set forth above, the Court's prior ruling on 
attorney's fees was interlocutory in nature and the Court has a right to review the materials 
presented and to amend those rulings and orders prior to or at the time of rendering its final 
judgment 
While it is the Plaintiffs belief and position that they are entitled to all fees they 
requested, the Plaintiffs did not appeal the Court's rulings and have not filed a request for 
reconsideration or other more definitive ruling on the reason for the Court's reduction of the total 
of fees requested 
The Defendant's main argument in opposition to attorney's fees is one that he has made 
at several stages in this litigation That is a provision found in UCA § 38-11-107 This code 
section found in the chapter known as the "Residence Lien Restrictions and Lien Recovery Fund 
Act " Simply provides a methodology whereby subcontractors may file their lien, against 
personal residences without fear of having to pay attorney's fees if it is subsequently discovered 
that the homeowner has complied with the strictures of the Residence Lien and Lien Recovery 
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Fund Act which precludes the filing of liens against personal residences The provision does not 
give a subcontractor or other individual carte blanche permission to file a purported mechanic's 
lien and not have to pay the penalty if the lien itself is wrongful Expansion of the section 
beyond the Lien Recovery Act would make several other statutory provisions in the mechanic's 
lien statute completely nonsensical. Not only does the cited provision not extend to the 
Wrongful Lien Statute, but it does not even extend beyond its limited scope to other actions 
involving the Mechanic's Lien Statute. 
As Plaintiffs are entitled to their fees pursuant to statute they would further request this 
court supplement and augment those fees for the costs of responding to the Appeal of the 
Defendant 
III. THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST TO FILE A COUNTERCLAIM 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure a compulsory counterclaim shall be filed and a 
permissive counterclaim may be filed within the 20 days allowed for filing the answer. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 12(a), 13(a) and (b). However, when a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through 
oversight, inadvertence or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set 
up the counterclaim by amendment. Utah R. Civ. P. 13(e). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure R. 15 
provides that a party who has not amended his pleadings within the time frame provided for in the 
rule may amend his pleadings "only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party;". 
In interpreting Rule 15(a), the Utah Supreme Court has stated that" the granting of leave to 
amend is a matter which lies within the broad discretion of the Court, and its rulings are not to be 
disturbed in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the 
complaining party" Girard v Appleby, 660 P2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983). 
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ln Girard , the Utah Supreme Court upheld a trial courts determination not to allow a 
Plaintiff to add new and different causes of action the day of trial. In Tripp v. Vaughan, 746 P2d 
794 (Utah App. 1987) the Utah Court of Appeals likewise upheld the decision by the trial court 
to deny a Motion to add a counterclaim two weeks before a trial was scheduled and some 13 
months after the action had been initially brought. Tripp at 798. 
In both cases the Court stated that it was up to the party making the motion to 
demonstrate adequate reasons for the untimeliness of the filing of the Motion. Mr. Cline has 
failed to provide any such reasons within his Memorandum. 
In this case, the length of time and the fact that the Court has effectively disposed of all 
issues in this litigation leads to the inescapable conclusion that the motion is untimely. A review 
of the proposed counterclaim, demonstrates that it is more of the same problem that has already 
beset this litigation and indeed that is the root of this litigation. It is simply a scandalous, libelous 
and slanderous series of half truths and blatant lies spread by the Defendant in an attempt to 
embarrass the Plaintiffs. 
Furthermore, it contains purported causes of actions and claims on issues which this Court 
has already ruled against the Defendant. Namely, his claims under the mechanic's lien statute. It 
contains claims and allegations relating to the purported "partnership" with the Defendant's wife 
(Plaintiffs daughter) and work purportedly done on the Plaintiffs property which the Defendant 
has failed to provide any evidence of, even though he was served with direct Discovery Requests 
demanding such evidence and proof 
The Defendant has repeatedly stated that his claims against the Plaintiffs were not related 
to a desire to obtain more money from them. The Defendant's motion and proposed counterclaim 
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demonstrate that the actions and efforts of the Defendant are nothing more than a bad faith effort 
to "punish" the Plaintiffs for the Defendants failures as a father and a husband 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING PLAINTIFF 
THEIR DAMAGES UNDER THE M E C H A N I C S LIEN STATUTE. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint set forth three causes of action, a wrongful lien statute claim, 
mechanic's lien statute claim, and punitive damages claim The wrongful lien statute provides for 
an expedited hearing to determine the legitimacy of a lien and to afford a property owner relief 
from wrongful liens. The Mechanic's Lien statute requires, instead of an expedited hearing, the 
property owner to come up with a bond in order to get the lien released pending the outcome of 
the litigation. 
Clearly the most cost effective manner in obtaining relief from a lien such as the one filed 
by the Defendant here was the wrongful lien statute's expedited hearing. 
Under the terms of the statute, the hearing to nullify the lien does not encompass the issue 
of damages. That issue is reserved for trial or later hearing. 
In this case the trial court found in favor of the Plaintiffs at the wrongful lien hearing and 
ordered that the lien was void in ab initio. 
Subsequently the Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on all three claims. The trial 
court held that the punitive damage claim was subsumed by either or both the mechanic's lien 
statute and the wrongful lien statute. This is based on the fact that both statutes contained 
provisions awarding exemplary damages in certain circumstances. 
The court further found that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that Plaintiffs had met 
their burden under the wrongful lien statute for the $3,000.00 damages figure. 
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The court found however that if it were to award damages under the mechanic's lien statute 
that would be improper as in the court's view the Plaintiff was obligated to elect its remedy between 
the wrongful hen and mechanics lien statutes In Appellant s brief, he argues that the courts 
requiring of a choice between the statutes was improper Appellees agree with that conclusion 
Election of remedies is a "technical rule of procedure whose purpose is not to prevent 
recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong Said doctrine 
presupposes a choice between inconsistent remedies, and knowledgeable selection of one thereof, 
free of fraud or imposition, and resort to the chosen route evidencing a purpose to forego all others 
McKeonv Krump, 53 P 3d 494, 497 (Utah App 2002) The doctrine of election of remedies 
"applies as a bar only where the two actions are inconsistent, generally based upon incompatible 
facts, the doctrine does not operate as an estoppel where the two or more remedies are given to 
readdress the same wrong and are consistent Where the remedies afforded are inconsistent, it is the 
election of one that bars the other, but where they are consistent, it is the satisfaction that operates 
as a bar" Farmers and Merchs , Bank v Universal C I T Credit Corp , 4 Utah 2d 155, 289 P 2d. 
1045, 1049(1955) 
It is that latter situation that exists in this case The wrongful lien statute provides 
damages for a lien filed against another persons property which meets the statutory strictures for 
being a wrongful lien The Defendant's lien in this case meets those strictures. 
The mechanic's lien statute on the other hand awards damages, under the provisions 
sought, under a completely different set of facts The damages are likewise different 
encompassing an amount double the amount that the stated lien is in excess of any legitimate lien. 
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The mechanic s lien statute applies to all liens which purport to be mechanic's liens If a 
document purports to be a mechanic's lien but turns out in fact not to be a legitimate mechanic's 
hen but a wrongful lien that does not in some fashion remove it from the penalties and strictures 
involved m the statute Because the remedies are consistent and in these limited circumstances 
both statutes apply the trial court's ruling was in error and the matter should be remanded to the 
trial court for a finding with respect to Plaintiffs entitlement to damages under the mechanic's 
hen statute 
V, DEFENDANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DENIED BASED 
ON HIS FAILURE TO PROPERLY MARTIAL THE EVIDENCE. 
In this action there were two hearings The first hearing was an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of the Plaintiffs position to nullify the Defendant's wrongful lien That hearing was held 
June 14, 2002, and there is a transcript of that hearing in the record for this appeal 
The second hearing was the summary judgment hearing held November 27, 2002 It was 
that hearing that resulted in the order and final judgment in this case According to Defendant s 
docketing statement it is that order that he is appealing from The Defendant has not however 
requested a transcript of that hearing and there is no such transcript as part of the record 
The trial court entered specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as result of that 
hearing To successfully challenge the trial court's finding, the Defendant must demonstrate that 
the findings are erroneous To make such a showing, the Defendant must martial all of the 
evidence supporting the finding, and then demonstrate how this evidence when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the finding, is insufficient to support it Fishery Fisher, 907 P 2d 1172, 
1177 (Utah App 1995) Not only has the Defendant failed to martial all the evidence but the 
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Defendant has failed to even order the necessary transcripts to martial the evidence. Due to the 
Defendant's failure to martial the evidence, this court should not disturb the factual findings on 
the trial court. Beesley v. Harris, 883 P 2d. 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994). 
CONCLUSION 
This case arose from the actions of the Defendant in filing a lien against, initially the 
home of his in-laws and number of their neighbors and subsequently solely against his in-laws. 
The lien, purporting to be a mechanic's lien failed to meet the strictures of the statute on a number 
of different basis. It didn't meet the requirements of the items that had to be set forth in the lien, 
it was not the result of a "contract", and it was not filed for a proper purpose. Indeed at the two 
hearings and by affidavit the Defendant has repeatedly stated that the lien was not filed in order to 
receive money, but instead was filed in retribution for what he perceived was a lien that was to be 
filed against property that the Defendant and his wife had owned in Salt Lake City. 
Defendant filed a lien in the amount of $70,300.00. Although he was asked directly for 
the value of services and materials that he purportedly provided, the Defendant has failed to 
produce any evidence to support his claim for work performed. The court made specific factual 
findings with respect to these issues as a result of the summary judgment hearing. The Defendant 
has failed to obtain a transcript of that hearing and has failed to martial the evidence as required 
by the relevant case law. 
The Defendant has objected to the courts award of attorney's fees but he has failed to 
challenge those fees on any basis that is allowable. In essence his sole defense is the misuse of a 
limitation on attorney's fees under the residential lien recovery Hind portion of the mechanic's 
lien act. Clearly under the facts established in this case the Plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment 
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not only under the wrongful hen statute but the mechanic s lien statute as well Accordingly, this 
court should dismiss the appeal of the appellant and should either award the Plaintiffs 
$140,600 00 additional damages, as double the amount of the improperly claimed mechanic's 
lien, or remand this matter on this one sole issue to the trial court for a calculation of the 
appropriate damages under the mechanic's lien statute 
Furthermore, pursuant to both statutory schemes the Plaintiff should be awarded their 
additional attorney's fees and costs incurred in responding to this appeal 
DATED this^ 'day of December, 2003 
LARSON, TURNER, FAIRBANKS & DALBY 
t ^ / ^ 
Snawn D Turner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thef^Jday of December, 2003 a true and correct copy of Brief of 
Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following 
Earl Chne II 
1565 East 7200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12 
C 
WESTS UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART HI. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
Copr. © West Group 2003. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 7-1-2003. 
RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant shall serve an 
answer within twenty days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within 
thirty days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served with a pleading 
stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a 
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the 
court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion 
under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a 
motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for responding to the 
remaining claims: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive pleading 
shall be served within ten days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten 
days after the service of the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is 
required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency 
of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) 
failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a 
further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or 
objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If 
a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the 
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the 
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay 
the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether 
made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12 
heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearings and 
determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or 
ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a 
more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects 
complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten 
days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to 
which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading 
is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the 
court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 
scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the other motions 
herein provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all 
defenses and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall not thereafter 
make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by answer 
or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of 
failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be 
made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the 
merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, 
shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any motion made 
pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this state, or is a 
foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable 
necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security 
for payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required of 
any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered within 30 days of 
the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
[Amended effective November 1, 2000.] 
Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 12 
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C 
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART HI PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
Copr © West Group 2003 All rights reserved 
Current with amendments received through 7-1 -2003 
RULE 13 COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM 
(a) Compulsory Counterclaims, A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving 
the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it anses out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not lequire for its adjudication the presence of third parties of 
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the action 
was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon 
his claim by attachment or other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal 
judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 13 
(b) Permissive Counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim agamst an opposing party not 
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim 
(c) Counterclaim Exceeding Opposing Claim. A counterclaim may or may not diminish or defeat the recovery 
sought by the opposing party It may claim relief exceeding m amount or different in kind from that sought in the 
pleading of the opposing party 
(d) Counterclaim Maturing or Acquired After Pleading. A claim which either matured or was acquired by the 
pleader after serving his pleading may, with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by 
supplemental pleading 
(e) Omitted Counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or 
excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment 
(1) Cross-Claim Against Co-Party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party agamst a 
co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the onginal action or of a 
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of the original action Such cross-claim 
may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or 
part of a claim asserted m the action against the cross-claunant 
(g) Additional Parties May be Brought In. When the presence of parties other than those to the onginal action 
is required for the granting of complete relief in the deteimination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall 
order them to be brought in as defendants as provided m these rules, if jurisdiction of them can be obtained 
(h) Separate Judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may be rendered in accordance with the 
terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of the opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of 
(i) Cross Demands Not Affected by Assignment or Death. When cross demands have existed between persons 
under such circumstances that, if one had brought an action agamst the other, a counterclaim could have been set 
up, the two demands shall be deemed compensated so far as they equal each other, and neither can be depnved of 
the benefit thereof by the assignment or death of the other, except as provided in Subdivision (j) of this rule 
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(j) Claims Against Assignee. Except as otherwise provided by law as to negotiable instruments and assignments 
of accounts receivable, any claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been asserted against an assignor 
at the time of or before notice of such assignment, may be asserted against his assignee, to the extent that such 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee. 
[Amended effective November 1, 2001.] 
Rules Civ. Proa, Rule 13 
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PART HI. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
Copr © West Group 2003. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 7-1-2003. 
RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not 
been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a 
party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time 
remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever 
period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or 
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these 
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not 
affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within 
the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the 
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a 
continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out 
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such 
terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even 
though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor. 
Rules Civ. Proa, Rule 15 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 38. LIENS 
CHAPTER 1 MECHANICS' LIENS 
38-1-7 Notice of claim --Contents --Recording --Service on owner of property. 
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for record with the 
county recorder of the county in which the property, or some part of the property, 
is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien within 90 days from the 
date: 
(a) the person last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or 
material on a project or improvement for a residence as defined in Section 38-
11-102; or 
(b) of final completion of an original contract not involving a residence as 
defined in Section 38-11-102. 
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement setting forth: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the 
record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom the lien claimant was employed or to whom 
the lien claimant furnished the equipment or material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the 
first and last equipment or material was furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; 
(e) the name, current address, and current phone number of the lien claimant; 
(f) the signature of the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent; 
(g) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, 
Recording of Documents; and 
(h) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as defined in Section 
38-11- 102, a statement describing what steps an owner, as defined in Section 
UT ST §38-1-7 
UCA. 1953 §38-1-7 
38-11- 102, may take to require a lien claimant to remove the lien in 
accordance with Section 38-11-107. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), an acknowledgment or certificate is not 
required for any notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989. 
(4) (a) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant 
shall deliver or mail by certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to: 
(i) the reputed owner of the real property; or 
(ii) the record owner of the real property. 
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the lien 
claimant, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of the 
record owner, using the names and addresses appearing on the last completed 
real property assessment rolls of the county where the affected property is 
located. 
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or 
record owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' 
fees against the reputed owner or record owner in an action to enforce the 
lien. 
(5) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make rules 
governing the form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(h). 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1386; C.L. 1917, § 3736; L. 1931, ch. 6, § 1; 
R.S. 1933 Sc C. 1943, 52-1-7; L. 1949, ch 63, § 1; 1979, ch. 143, § 1; 1981, ch. 
169, § 1; 1985, ch. 197, § 1; 1987, ch. 170, § 3; 1989, ch. 195, § 1; 1989, ch. 
271, § 5; 1994, ch. 308, § 4; 1995, ch. 172, § 1; 1998, ch. 49, § 1; 1999, ch. 
223, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. --The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998, substituted "the 
lien claimant" for any form of the pronoun "he" in the section; divided Subsection 
(2) (e) , added the Subsection (2) (f) designation, added the designation and text of 
UT ST §38-9-1 
UCA 1953 §38-9-1 
C 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 3 8 LIENS 
CHAPTER 9. WRONGFUL LIEN 
38-9-1 Definitions. 
As used m this chapter: 
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful 
property interest in certain real property, including an owner, title holder, 
mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner. 
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property who 
offers a document for recording or filing with any county recorder in the 
state asserting a lien or other claim of interest in certain real property. 
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in certain real 
property. 
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, 
lawful property interest in certain real property, including an owner, 
titleholder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and 
interest in that real property appears in the county recorder's records for 
the county in which the property is located. 
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest in certain 
real property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's records for the 
county in which the property is located. 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it 
is recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal 
statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of 
the real property. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 38 LIENS 
CHAPTER 9 WRONGFUL LIEN 
38-9-2 Scope. 
(1) (a) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1, 38 9 3, 38 9-4, 38-9-5, and 38 9 6 
apply to any recording or filing or any rejected recording or filing of a lien 
pursuant to this chapter on or after May 5, 1997 
(b) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1 and 38-9-7 apply to all liens of record 
regardless of the date the lien was recorded or filed 
(2) The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a person from filing a lis 
pendens in accordance with Section 78-40-2 or seeking any other relief permitted 
by law 
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under Section 
38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens. 
History: C 1953, 38-9-2, enacted by L 1997, ch 125, § 3, 1999, ch 122, § 1 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repeals and Reenactments. --Laws 1997, ch. 125, § 3 repeals former § 38-9-2, as 
enacted by Laws 1985, ch 182, § 2, relating to an unauthorized lien as invalid, 
and enacts the present section For present comparable provision, see § 38-9-7 
Amendment Notes. --The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, added the Subsection 
(1) (a) designation; substituted the list of sections in Subsection (1) (a) for 
"this chapter", added Subsection (1Mb); and added "Mechanics' Liens" in 
Subsection (3). 
U C A . 1953 § 38-9-2, UT ST § 38-9-2 
Current through 2003 First Special Session 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 38. LIENS 
CHAPTER 9. WRONGFUL LIEN 
38-9-4 Civil liability for filing wrongful lien --Damages. 
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder 
against real property is liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages 
proximately caused by the wrongful lien. 
(2) If the person in violation of this Subsection (1) refuses to release or 
correct the wrongful lien within 20 days from the date of written request from a 
record interest holder of the real property delivered personally or mailed to the 
last-known address of the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record 
interest holder for $1,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and 
for reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or for 
treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and 
costs, who records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as 
defined in Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real 
property, knowing or having reason to know that the document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim. 
History: C. 1953, 38-9-4, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 125, § 5. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repeals and Reenactments. --Laws 1997, ch. 125, § 5 repeals former § 38-9-4, as 
enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 182, § 4, relating to venue, costs, and attorney fees, 
and enacts the present section. For present provisions, see § 38-9-6. 
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TITLE 38. LIENS 
CHAPTER 9. WRONGFUL LIEN 
38-9-7 Petition to nullify lien --Notice to lien claimant --Summary relief 
--Finding of wrongful lien --Wrongful lien is void. 
(1) Any record interest holder of real property against which a wrongful lien as 
defined in Section 38-9-1 has been recorded may petition the district court in the 
county in which the document was recorded for summary relief to nullify the lien. 
(2) The petition shall state with specificity the claim that the lien is a 
wrongful lien and shall be supported by a sworn affidavit of the record interest 
holder. 
(3) (a) If the court finds the petition insufficient, it may dismiss the 
petition without a hearing. 
(b) If the court finds the petition is sufficient, the court shall schedule a 
hearing within ten days to determine whether the document is a wrongful lien. 
(c) The record interest holder shall serve a copy of the petition on the lien 
claimant and a notice of the hearing pursuant to Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 4, Process. 
(d) The lien claimant is entitled to attend and contest the petition. 
(4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether or not a 
document is a wrongful lien. The proceeding shall not determine any other property 
or legal rights of the parties nor restrict other legal remedies of any party. 
(5) (a) Following a hearing on the matter, if the court determines that the 
document is a wrongful lien, the court shall issue an order declaring the 
wrongful lien void ab initio, releasing the property from the lien, and 
awarding costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the petitioner. 
(b) (i) The record interest holder may record a certified copy of the 
order with the county recorder. 
(ii) The order shall contain a legal description of the real property. 
UT ST §38-9-7 
U.CA. 1953 §38-9-7 
(c) If the court determines that the claim of lien is valid, the court shall 
dismiss the petition and may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the 
lien claimant- The dismissal order shall contain a legal description of the 
real property. The prevailing lien claimant may record a certified copy of the 
dismissal order. 
(6) If the district court determines that the lien is a wrongful lien as defined 
in Section 38-9-1, the wrongful lien is void ab initio and provides no notice of 
claim or interest. 
(7) If the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage proceedings may not 
be expedited under this section. 
History: C. 1953, 38-9-7, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 125, § 8. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Effective Dates. --Laws 1997, ch. 125 became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Future interest. 
Plaintiffs were entitled to summary relief where the parties' sales agreement did 
not convey defendants an interest in property, but only a qualified promise to do 
so at a later time, and therefore defendants' filed notice of interest was a 
wrongful lien under § 38-9-1. Russell v. Thomas, 2000 UT App 82, 999 P.2d 1244. 
U.CA. 1953 § 38-9-7, UT ST § 38-9-7 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 38. LIENS 
CHAPTER 11. RESIDENCE LIEN RESTRICTION AND LIEN RECOVERY FUND ACT 
PART 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS 
38-11-107 Restrictions upon maintaining a lien against residence or owner's 
interest in the residence. 
(1) A person qualified to file a lien upon an owner-occupied residence and the 
real property associated with that residence under the provisions of Title 38, 
Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens, who provides qualified services under an agreement 
effective on or after January 1, 1995, other than directly with the owner, shall 
be barred after January 1, 1995, from maintaining a lien upon that residence and 
real property or recovering a judgment in any civil action against the owner or 
the owner-occupied residence to recover monies owed for qualified services 
provided by that person if: 
(a) the conditions described in Subsections 38-11-204 (3) (a) and (3)(b) are 
met; or 
(b) (i) a subsequent owner purchases a residence from an owner; 
(ii) the subsequent owner who purchased the residence under Subsection 
(1)(b)(i) occupies the residence as a primary or secondary residence 
within 180 days from the date of transfer or the residence is occupied by 
the subsequent owner's tenant or lessee as a primary or secondary 
residence within 180 days from the date of transfer; and 
(iii) the owner from whom the subsequent owner purchased the residence met 
the conditions described in Subsections 38-11-204(3)(a) and (3)(b). 
(2) If a residence is constructed under conditions that do not meet all of the 
provisions of Subsection (1) , that residence and the real property associated with 
that residence as defined in Section 38-1-4, shall be subject to any mechanics' 
lien as provided in Section 38-1-3. 
(3) A lien claimant who files a mechanics' lien or foreclosure action upon an 
owner-occupied residence is not liable for costs and attorneys' fees under 
Sections 38-1-17 and 38-1-18 or for any damages arising from a civil action 
related to the lien filing or foreclosure action if the lien claimant removes the 
lien within ten days from the date the owner establishes compliance, through 
written findings of fact from a court of competent jurisdiction or, in cases where 
a bankruptcy has been filed, from the director, with the requirements of 
Subsections 38-11-204(3)(a) and (3)(b). 
ADDENDUM "B" 
PENNY C. ABBOTT 
Reporter-Transcriber 
1817 East 800 South 
Salem, UT 84653 
July 21 , 2003 
Fourth District Court 
1361 So. Hwy40 
Heber City, UT 84032 
U T H D I S T P i : - „.-? 
W A S , ; - . , .
 l . - ' -
1
. 
PH: 1-801-423-6463 
FAX: l-80J#Hfe£k2fflS3IM 8: 
LIC: 22-102811-7801 
email, pennyabbott@earthlmk.net 
CASE NAME: PACKER VS. CLINE 
Trial No: 
Appeal No: 
Hearing Date: 
Dear Clerks, 
020500239 
20030468-CA 
6-14-02 
Enclosed please find the original transcript of the above-referenced 
hearing and original audiotape # 6-14-02 # 1 . 
This transcript is for appeal purposes 
Sincerely,, 
Penny C. ^Soott 
Enc. 
Delivery Confirmation #0301 0120 0001 7529 3039 
*si «r 
Ufeh O 
Clsf& cs u*e Court 
*+.u* * # 
II 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - HEBER COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EDSON F. PACKER, 
Plaintiff, 
MOTION TO NULLIFY LIEN 
vs. 
EARL CLINE, 
Defendant. 
Case 020500239 
Appeal 20030468-CA 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on June 14, 2002. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
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(From Electronic Recording) 
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A-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E-S 
SHAWN D. TURNER, ESQ. 
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SOUTH JORDAN UT 84095-0921 
FOR DEFENDANT: 
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1565 E 7200 S 
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
(June 14, 2002) 
THE JUDGE: Call the case of Edson F. Packer as 
trustee for the Edson F. Packer and Sharon P. Packer Trust, 
plaintiff, versus Earl CJine, defendant. 
MR. TURNER: Shawn Turner on behalf of the 
plaintiffs, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE 
MR. CLINE 
THE JUDGE 
Okay. 
Earl Cline, Your Honor. 
Okay. Okay. This comes before the 
Court on a petition to remove wrongful lien. Mr. Turner has 
filed that motion. Are you ready to proceed? 
MR. TURNER: I am, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. You may proceed. 
STATEMENT BY MR. TURNER 
MR. TURNER: Your Honor, the statute is not 
exactly clear on how this proceeding is supposed to go 
forward. I, I — 
THE JUDGE: Well, let me just make this comment. 
I've had several of these type hearings. The definition, 
the definition of wrongful lien, you know is, basically 
states that a, a wrongful lien is a lien that is not 
authorized by law or is not signed by the owners of the, of 
the property. 
Clearly a mechanic's lien is a lien authorized by 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
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law. It might, you know, and I understand that you allege 
that Mr. Clme, that the lien might be groundless. But it's 
clearly not a wrongful lien, is it? 
MR. TURNER: Well, it is. Because it's, in 
addition to being groundless, Your Honor, it's facially 
insufficient. And, and that allegation has been made as 
well. And that, as a matter of law the Court can determine 
that because it doesn't contain the elements required to be 
filed by statute. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Why don't you set forth. It 
doesn't... Well, one thing it doesn't clearly state when the, 
when the work was completed, performed and completed. 
MR. TURNER: Right. And that, that's not there. 
Also because this is a lien on a residence there was 
a requirement that it contained the steps to the owner on how 
he might go about releasing the lien. Neither one of those 
two items were contained within the document. 
And a, I do have witnesses here today that are 
willing to testify, Your Honor, as to what work was done, when 
it was done, when it was completed. 
THE JUDGE: Was it, was it even timely? 
MR. TURNER: And it's clearly not timely, 
Your Honor. We have documentary evidence that shows that the 
work was completed in April of 2001. 
In addition to that, Your Honor, there was no 
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contract ever entered between the parties. And when you look 
at the statute, Utah Code1 Annotated Section 38-1-2 provides 
that, that the lien, mechanics lien statute applies in 
situations where a contractor or a subcontractor does work or 
furnishes materials by contract. There was no contract here 
express or implied, written, or in any other fashion. The 
only reference to any sort of alleged agreement that's been 
made by Mr. Cline is he claims that his wife, and they're 
currently in divorce proceedings, said that her parents were 
going to pay them something for the work that his wife was 
doing on this mural. And, and a, Julie Cline is here to 
testify today, Your Honor, that's just not true. 
And, and so his, his statement, his only basis for 
that would be, one, hearsay, because it's a statement possibly 
made by somebody else through somebody else. And two, what 
he's essentially trying to claim is that for the labor that 
his, the ex-wife had performed on, on her parents' home he's 
entitled to a $70,000 lien. 
And a, we can also show, Your Honor, that this is 
the second lien that Mr. Cline filed on this property. He 
filed one lien that not only encompassed this property but all 
of the neighbors around the property as well were, were 
liened. And Mr. Cline then released that lien and refiled 
this one. In the original lien you can see where Mr. Cline 
had written in a supposed amount of $30,000 and scratched 
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through that and then wrote in the $70,300 figure. 
This lien, Your Honor, is simply an attempt to 
harass the Packers and create problems for them as Mr. Packer 
was getting financing. And it's, it's retribution for the 
divorce proceedings that Mr. Cline is going through with his 
wife. 
And, and we would like to have the lien released 
because it is legally insufficient and, therefore, it is an 
invalid lien. And since he was not party to any contract 
he was not entitled to file a mechanics lien. Simply by 
listing a document as a mechanics lien does not make it 
something that can be done according to law. 
And I do have witnesses if Your Honor would like to 
take that testimony. 
THE JUDGE: Your response, Mr. Cline? 
STATEMENT BY MR. CLINE 
MR. CLINE: First of all, Your Honor, the lien was 
timely. Okay. The work is in continuous progress. I can 
take you into the house right now and show you that part of 
the fireplace is still not completed, that they're still 
working on it. I can show you— 
THE JUDGE: One of the... What... One of the 
deficiencies is that you have to state when the work began and 
when it was completed. You don't state that, do you, in 
your, in your— 
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MR. CLINE: I don't believe... I had the lien 
prepared by a, by a title company, Your Honor, and a, and 
probably made the assumption that they had done it correctly 
because they do it all the time. The— 
THE JUDGE: Did you also attach to the a, since 
it's, since... This is a residence, isn't it? 
MR. CLINE: It is. 
THE JUDGE: Did you attach to the lien a, the 
means by which the lien could be released as required by 
statute? 
MR. CLINE: I did not, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Aren't those deficiencies that would 
require that the Court... You miqht have a basis to, you know, 
this is not to say that a, it would go to your claim that you 
a, have a right to recover monetary damages against these 
individuals. This only goes to the basis on which you can 
claim a materialman's or a, or a mechanic's lien against this 
property. 
MR. CLINE: Okay. They're, they're asking for a, 
for damages for wrongful lien and all those. And I just want 
it stated on record that it was timely, that the work is in 
continuous progress, that a, in, in February my wife and I 
went and bought materials, a stencil that she was going to 
continue, that she was going to put up on the, on the Packer 
home. In December she bought cloth to go in and finish. 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
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Again, that doesn't go to the other issues in your 
complaint or any issues that you might have, Mr. Cline. 
MR. TURNER: One last issue, Your Honor, the 
statute does provide in this situation that we're entitled to 
our attorney fees and costs on this motion. 
THE JUDGE: You may file an affidavit of 
attorney's fees pursuant to, to the Rules of Judicial 
Administration. 
Mr. Cline, if you object to the amount, the 
reasonableness of those attorney fees you may file an 
objection. 
MR. TURNER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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